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1 - Preliminary Remarks 
 
Religious values are internationally granted by several acts. 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
contains the fundamental principles protecting religious liberty as a matter 
of basic human rights jurisprudence1. Article 18 (1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)2 sets up the fundamental 
principles which guarantee the forum internum of religious belief3. In a 
General Comment, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) explicitly states 
that the concept of worship also extends “to ritual and ceremonial acts 
                                                          
* Paper, peer reviewed, for: Liber amicorum Tito Ballarino, Institut Suisse Droit 
Comparé. 
 
 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217a, 71 U.N. GAOR., 3d Sess., 1st 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948): “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion: this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”. See Wardle, 
Marriage and Religious Liberty: Comparative Law Problems and Conflict of Laws Solutions, 
Journal of Law and Family Studies, 12, 2010, p. 315. 
2 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 at 52 (1966), in force since 
3.1.1976; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, R.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) 21 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 52 (1966), in force since 23.3.1976. 
3 See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), GA Res. 217/A (III), 
10.12.1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71.  
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giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices integral to 
such acts, including the building of places of worship”4.  
In recent years, many debates in Europe have concerned religious 
values.  
Studies on the management of the growing religious pluralisation 
and diversity are increasingly fundamental. In fact, in the perspective of 
Horizon 2020, it must be pointed out that the consideration of religious 
values appears in keeping with one of the main goals of the EU, within the 
complex human rights common framework outlined by both the 
European Charter and by the ECHR. The discrimination based on 
religious grounds could be penalised by the European Institutions and by 
the ECtHR. The common framework of these solutions could be found in 
the neutrality towards the religious values, generally considered “the only 
possible synthesis through which the European institutions can subsume 
different national experiences regarding the phenomenon of religion 
within a common European law of religion”5. However the accession of 
the European States to the European Convention on Human Rights and to 
the European Union did not achieve the homogenisation in the protection 
of rights concerning religious topics. This consideration is confirmed for 
example by the various national rules about religious symbols, as recalled 
by the European Court of Human Rights, through the national margin of 
appreciation. In some cases the state authorizes the displaying of non- 
proselytizing symbols, (such as the crucifix in Italy) 6; in others, the State 
bans the displaying of such symbols (like France, Spain and Italy for the 
burqa and the niqab). 
The recent decisions of the Strasbourg Court on national bans of the 
use of the veil and the European rules highlight that two conflicting 
models seem to be equally accepted7: the multicultural one, in which the 
                                                          
4 Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 40, § 4 of the ICCPR, General Comment No. 22(48), The right to 
freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 4 (July 30, 
1993), § 4: hereinafter General Comment No. 22. 
5 A. Ferrari, S. Pastorelli, (eds.) (2013) The Burqa Affair Across Europe (Between Public and 
Private Space). 
6 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 70 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Grand Chamber Mar 18, 2011), 
http://www.echr.coe.int; in this case, the Grand Chamber reversed the judgment of the 
Second Chamber (Lautsi v. Italy, App. No., 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H. R., Second Section, Nov., 
3, 2009, http://www.echr.coe.int), holding that “the decision whether crucifixes should be 
present in State-school classrooms is, in principle a matter falling within the margin of 
appreciation of the respondent State”. See § 68.  
7 Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001), N. 42393/98, Eur Cour. HR 449; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey 
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community prevails over the individual, on the assumption of the 
acceptance that all cultures are placed on the same level, having equal 
relevance8; the intercultural one, in which the individual prevails over the 
minority community whose interests are subordinated to those of the 
individuals, as pluralism is limited in the name of the common values of 
the community-state9. 
Within the intercultural approach, the problem of religious values 
in conflict of laws arises. 
In fact it must be pointed out that the national systems differ in the 
way they see the relationship between law and religion: as distinct, as in 
secular and Western legal systems, or as interconnected as in the Jewish 
and in the Islamic traditions. Within some systems religion is the factor to 
solve the conflict of laws that instead of inter – territorial become inter – 
personal, like in India, where, in regard to the Law of Persons (marriage, 
adoption, legitimacy and legitimation) each of the religious communities 
inhabiting the subcontinent, namely the Hindu, the Muslim, the Christian, 
the Parsi, the Buddhist, the Sikh and the Jain (the last three are usually 
deemed to be part of the Hindu community) is governed by its own 
personal law, legislative or customary. Personal laws give rise to conflicts 
in cases of family and succession law which result from the conversion of 
a spouse from a faith to another (i.e. by marriage), even without any 
change in the other connecting factors (domicile)10. In other countries, 
separate religious or customary courts decide issues relating family 
matters, alongside state tribunals (such as Israel and many Islamic 
countries); while finally in some Islamic nations we may find Islam as the 
state religion. 
Generally speaking, problems arise when people cross borders or 
act in a country other than their own, because of the different nature of 
institutions and rules. The fact that the same word is used does not mean 
that the effects are, or ought to be, the same. So, the problem with 
differences in the ways of formalizing relationships among individuals 
                                                                                                                                                               
(2005), N. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H. R. 173, 165; Dogru v. France (2009), N. 27058/05, 
Eur. H. R. Rep., 182; Aktas v. France (2009), N. 43563/08; Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey 
(2010), N. 41135/98; S.a.s. v. France (2011), N. 43835/11; see C.W.Jr. DURHAM, D.M. 
KIRKHAM, T. LINDHOLM, Islam and Political–Cultural Europe, 2012. 
8 S.a.s. v. France [2011], Eur. Cour. N. 43835/11, § 87, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145466. 
9 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 70 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Grand Chamber Mar 18, 2011), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
10 V.C. GOVINDARAJ, The Conflict of Laws in India, New Delhi, Oxford University 
Press, 2011. 
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may contrast with their recognition and consequently may frustrate 
individuals’ actions. 
The expression “conflict of laws” is used just because of the fact that 
national laws with respect to legal relationships differ from state to state, 
thus giving rise to conflict. Rules of choice of law are devised and applied 
by courts with the objective of resolving conflicts between the laws so as to 
render justice to the parties, subject to constitutional limitations and 
statutory directives of the concerned state. 
In family relationships, religious values are more relevant that in 
other contexts. For example, in some countries, marriages take place 
according a religious form, while other countries require a civil marriage: 
will either system give effect to the other’s form of marriage? When a 
Muslim husband in India repudiates his Italian wife by pronouncing the 
formula of repudiation “TALAQ” three times, can this repudiation be 
recognised in Europe? Some marriages take place when the spouses are 
not in the same country. This often seems to occur within communities 
dispersed because of war or persecution such as the Somalis. It is not 
unusual to see the use of proxy or telephone marriages where one or both 
spouses are not present at the marriage ceremony. Under Muslim law 
these are perfectly lawful arrangements. According to the British Asylum 
and Immigration Tribunal, they are not to be recognized for immigration 
purposes11.  
To solve these conflicts, we have to deal with the general problem 
of the cultural identity, answering a simple question: may the cultural 
identity and the various factors connected to it, i.e. religion, “personalize” 
the conflict of laws, even where conflicts are usually deemed to be 
interterritorial?  
The answer to this question is not easy because, national systems of 
conflict of laws sometimes attempt to prevent reliance on other laws, 
above all when religious values become relevant. For example, English 
private international law rules were rewritten in 1970s to prevent Muslims 
from using extra – judicial means of divorcing12. This contradictory system 
of rules is accompanied by the well known regulation set by the Asylum 
and Immigration Act 2004: the UK introduced a requirement for a 
certificate of approval for marriage. Those who were not European 
Economic Area nationals or did not have indefinite leave to remain in the 
                                                          
11 P. SHAH, Transnational Family Relations in migration contexts: British variations on 
European Themes, Religare, 2011, 7, p. 15. 
12 D. PEARL, W. MENSKI, Muslim Family Law, 3rd edition, Sweet &. Maxw, London, 
1998. 
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UK were obliged to acquire a certificate of approval upon paying a fee and 
submitting relevant documents to the Home Office. Only after that, they 
could apply to a registrar for a license to marry. People marrying in the 
Anglican Church were exempt from such a requirement13. 
Sometimes national systems forbid the application of the foreign 
law, focusing on the lex fori; recently, several problems have been pointed 
out by the 2010 Save Our State Amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution, 
as well as by the 2011 Arizona Foreign Decisions Act, both focused on the 
Sharia14. 
However, the human rights framework highlights the need to read 
private international law rules in view of the intercultural approach as a 
way to achieve the legal pluralism15, or to say it with Shah, to consider the 
conflict of law rules a way to achieve the “comity of people” instead of the 
“comity of nations”16. In this context, international harmony, as the main 
core of private international law, must be probably refocused on the law 
governing personal identity in multicultural contexts. The emergence of a 
right to cultural identity, even if still vague and uncertain, can hardly be 
said to be without impact upon conflict of law rules17. The path to reach 
this solution is long and winding but we have at least three shortcuts to 
develop a legal strategy that seeks to protect religious values as a part of 
the individual cultural identity, so “personalizing” the conflict of laws 
rules. 
 
                                                          
13 The European Court of Human Rights found that these rules violated the couple’s 
right to marry and were discriminatory in conjunction with the right to marry and 
freedom of religion: O’ Donoghue and others v. the United Kingdom [2010], Eur. Cour. N. 
34838/07, § 87, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
14 Save Our State Amendment: “The courts … when exercising their judicial authority, 
shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States Constitution, the 
Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations promulgated 
pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and rules 
promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the United 
States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in making judicial 
decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. 
Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia law”. Arizona Foreign 
Decisions Act 2011: “… a court shall not use, implement, refer to or incorporate a tenet of 
any body of religious sectarian law”: H.B. 2582, 50th Legis 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 
15 J. GRIFFITHS, What is Legal Pluralism? Journal of Legal Pluralism 24 (1986), pp. 1-55. 
16 P. SHAH, Transnational Family Relations in migration contexts, p. 18. 
17 A. MALATESTA, Cultural Diversity and Private International Law, in Nuovi strumenti 
del diritto internazionale privato, Liber Fausto Pocar, 2009, II, 653, S. Bariatti, G. Venturini 
eds., Giuffrè, Milano, 2009. 
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2 - Religious values and nationality 
 
In the field of conflict of laws, religious values usually are included within 
the connecting factor of nationality. 
Following Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, and the Italian school of 
international law18, several systems maintain, as a consequence of the 
assumption that the Nation - based upon a unity of culture and will - is 
the unique, legitimate foundation of any independent State, that every 
national system of conflict of laws must respect the Law of nationality. 
This is a tribute to the Nations’ equal sovereignty, in the fields of civil law 
strictly connected with the national identity, as defined by language, 
religion, history, i.e. personal condition, marriage, family relations, 
succession in movables and immovables. 
The rules of conflict of laws in matters of personal status have been 
stated over the last three centuries, in order to consider the diversity of 
family situations, and to solve the difficulties related to the application of 
different national laws. 
On the one hand, the category of personal status have been broken 
down into several sub - categories all having their own rules: capacity, 
name, marriage, divorce, adoption; on the other hand, other rules have 
been developed, either declining subsidiary connecting factors based on 
Kegel’s ideas (the law of the common nationality, in the absence of which 
the law of the common habitual residence, in the absence of which the lex 
fori ecc.), or defining a new connecting factor, founded on the choice of the 
parties: the electio iuris19. 
However, in this context, nationality, a connecting factor essentially 
secular, instead becomes necessarily related to religious values when the 
national system recalled by it, is split on a personal basis in many legal 
systems. In the Continental European system of private international law, 
when a choice of law rule refers to foreign law, the applicable foreign law 
is to be treated as law by the courts, in all procedural aspects, and not as a 
fact contrary to the common law approach. The applicable foreign law 
may be of a religious origin, for example, when it is closely linked with 
Shari’a and Islam, or with the Canon law of the Roman Catholic Church, 
or with Talmudic law and Judaism. To be applicable in a dispute, the 
foreign law must, however, qualify as the law of a nation-state. The Shari’a, 
Talmudic law or Canon law, does not in itself constitute applicable law. A 
                                                          
18 S. TONOLO, L’Italia e il resto del mondo nel pensiero di Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, 
Cuadernos derecho transnacional, 3, 2011, pp. 178-192. 
19 See infra § 3. 
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religious law receives the label of state law only to the extent that it is 
recognized by the state, for example through codification, or is applied by 
the courts of the state.  
In order to choose the specific rule applicable to the case, religion 
becomes the determining factor, as for example in the Indian subcontinent. 
In fact, in cross-border cases, in particular when the persons have their 
origin in states with religion-based personal laws, the states of origin often 
demand full compliance with their religiously coordinated family laws, 
also when the persons concerned reside abroad.  
Some systems set up religious privileges like Section 5 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, according to which a Hindu marriage could take place only 
between two Hindus20, or like the hidden privilege disposed by article 19 – 
5 of the Iraqi civil code, affirming that if one of the spouses is Iraqi at the 
time of celebration of marriage, only Iraqi law shall be applicable. As the 
Iraqi system is split into several systems defined by individuals’ faith, 
following article 19-5, the judge, vested through the religious factor 
(Muslim Courts for Muslim people, Civil Courts for non Muslim people 
applying the law of the religious community to which the spouse belongs) 
must apply the religious rules of the Iraqi spouse21. 
When the functioning of this connecting factor leads to a system 
containing such privileges contrasting with other fundamental values, i.e. 
rights of women, rights of children, ecc., private international law offers 
the public policy exception, generally considered as the ultimate 
guarantee for the protection of the fundamental values of the forum state’s 
legal order. 
Public policy is subject to continuous reconsiderations and 
influenced by the political trends followed by each national court 
(relativity of public policy). Family law principles are often regarded as a 
matter of a country’s public policy, since marriage is an institution and a 
part of the normative reality of a State22. This is especially seen when we 
are confronted with the question of applying the family laws of a country 
belonging to another religious culture than our own. More generally, the 
coexistence of legal systems reflecting different traditions - including 
cultural and religious ones - points out the need of investigating about the 
fact that national courts are facing a growing number of cases in which the 
                                                          
20 V.C. GOVINDARAJ, The Conflict of Laws in India, p. 116. 
21 For a recent case, see Cass. Irak, 26.3.2007, Revue critique droit internationale privé, 
2009, 40: H. AL DABBAGH, Mariage mixte et conflit entre droits religieux et laïque, pp. 29-39. 
22 H. THUE, Connecting Factors in International Family Law, in Families Across Frontiers, 
pp. 53-62, N. Lowe & G. Douglas, (eds.), The Hague, Boston, London, 1996. 
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rules of different legal systems clash, within the well known phenomenon 
called “clash of civilizations”23. This, despite the fact that many Islamic 
countries are reforming their national systems of family law, by reducing 
the relevance recognized to religious values within their national systems 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia)24. 
Generally speaking, the religious origin of foreign rules should not, 
as such, been qualified as an infringement of the public policy of the 
forum state25. In fact, there are several cases of contrast with public policy, 
not determined by the application of religious values, like the same sex 
marriage26, or the post-death marriage27. However, in some cases religious 
values create a contrast with the public policy, like for polygamous 
marriage and repudiation, even if in many cases, institutions of Islamic 
law do not give raise to problems as for example the matrimonial regime 
of separation of property. 
Thus, religious values must be considered as a relevant factor in the 
conflict of laws’ field, but not necessarily as a source of conflicts. 
Europeanization and globalisation of sources of private 
international law do not preclude the chance that conflict of laws should 
also deal with individual identities and should offer different solutions. 
For example, repudiation has been evaluated by national courts 
differently. 
In Italian case law, its recognition has been prevented through the 
public policy exception, because of discrimination against women28, or for 
                                                          
23 P. MERCIER, Conflits de civilisations et droit international privé: polygamie et 
repudiation, Gèneve, 1972; J. DÉPREZ, Droit international privé et conflits de civiisations. 
Aspects méthodologiques. Les rélations entre systèmes d’Europe occidentale et systèmes islamiques 
en matière de statut personnel, Recueil des Cours, 211, 1988-IV, p. 9. 
24 A. QUINONES ESCAMEZ, La reception du noveau Code de la famille marocain 
(Moudawana 2004) en Europe, Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2004, p. 
877; K. SAIDI, La réforme du droit algérien de la famille: pérennité et rénovation, Revue 
internationale de droit comparé, 2006, p. 121. 
25 S. VRELLIS, Conflits ou coordination de valeurs en droit international privé, Recueil des 
Cours, 2007, 328, pp. 175-486; K. MEZIOU, Migrations et relations familiales, Recueil des 
Cours, 2009, 345, pp. 9-386; Z. Combalia, M.P. Diago, A. Gonzáles-Varas (eds.), Derecho 
islàmico e interculturalidad, Madrid, 2011; N. Bernard-Maugiron, B. Dupret (eds), Ordre 
public et droit musulman de la famille en Europe et en Afrique du Nord, Bruxelles, 2012. 
26 Not allowed in Italy: Cass., 15.3.2012 n. 4184. See the recent ECtHR, Oliari and o. v. 
Italy, App. No. 18766/11-36030/11 (Eur. Ct. H. R. July, 21 2015) http://www.echr.coe.int. 
27 Allowed for example by the Belgian case law: Cass., 2.4.1981, Rev. cr. Jur. Belge, 1983, 
p. 499.  
28 In Italy: App. Roma, 29.10.1948, Foro pad, 1949, I, p. 348; App. Milano, 17.12. 1991, 
Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1993, p. 109; App. Torino, 9.3.2006, Dir. fam., 2007, p. 156; Trib. 
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being pronounced without intervention of the court29. The main problem 
of this application of the public policy exception is the limping situation 
concerning the personal status of the individuals involved in the 
repudiation. A possible way to solve this problem is available recalling art. 
3, n. 2 letter e) of the l. 898/70 on the dissolution of marriage, literally 
ruled only for the wife who is Italian, allowing to consider the repudiation 
pronounced abroad like a ground for the application for divorce in Italy, 
even in cases of divorce claimed by foreign women domiciled in Italy30. In 
other cases the solution is found recognizing the repudiation, due to the 
principles of the public policy-proximity, like in a case concerning an 
Egyptian talaq31: in this case, Italian judges point out that the notion, put 
forward to protect the complex of values “that characterise the 
fundamental ethical and social structure of the national community in a 
given time in history must be reduced to ‘its core’, to the principles that 
are really indefeasible and fundamental” to the legal system. This core 
content cannot disregard the assertion of the essential rights of defence, as 
required by article 65 of Law 218/95. In the case, the Court of Appeal 
emphasizes that repudiation ensures a safeguarding of the adversarial 
principle since, under Egyptian law, the wife has the chance to ask for the 
dissolution of the marriage through the procedure of the khola and the 
talaq does not qualify as “simply a monitoring process, in which the 
plaintiff is limited to express - in a purely assertive manner - his claim of 
dissolution, but is structured as a complex procedure, “in which the 
possibility for the wife to intervene ensures the irreversible dissolution (...) 
of the sharing of lives and affection between spouses, and regulates the 
economic rights” of women. Given these considerations, no element of 
conflict with public order is found by the Court, whose scope overrides 
the fulfillment of the requirements “of Egyptian law for the validity and 
irrevocability of the divorce”. 
The public policy-proximity is a problematic concept, often leading 
to opposite solutions: in Belgium, despite the fact that the recognition of 
foreign repudiation is expressly regulated by Law of 16 July 2004 holding 
                                                                                                                                                               
Milano, 24.3.1994, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1995, p. 853; Trib. Milano, 11 3. 1995, Riv. dir. int. 
priv. proc., 1996, p. 129; in France: Cass., 1.6.1994, Revue critique, 1995, p. 103; Cass., 
31.1.1995, 569; Cass., 11.3.1997, Clunet, 1998, 10 
29 App. Milano, 14.12.1965, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1966, p. 381. 
30 C. CAMPIGLIO, La famiglia islamica nel diritto internazionale privato italiano, Riv. dir. 
int. priv. proc., 1999, p. 25, p. 38. 
31 App. Cagliari, 16.5.2008, www.immigrazione.it. 
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the code of private international law32, judges recognized the repudiation 
under the Moroccan law, not providing for the wife’s right to alimony, 
even if it had been a couple living in Belgium for more than nine years, or 
since the birth of their children33.  
In France, the relevant case law may be classified into three stages. 
After a first stage in favor for recognition of the repudiation, 
founded on the so called attenuated effect of the public policy exception, 
and in the light of some bilateral agreements on judicial cooperation 
concluded by France and some countries of North Africa34, acts of 
repudiation were not recognized because of several reasons: on the one 
hand, the judicial procedure not ensuring sufficiently the womens’ rights 
of defense (cd. ordre public procedural), on the other hand, the lack of 
provisions about maintenance obligations (ordre public alimentaire). The 
leading case is the judgment pronounced in 2004 by the Supreme Court35, 
                                                          
32 Article 57 - Foreign divorce based on the will of the husband: “§ 1. A foreign deed 
establishing the intent of the husband to dissolve the marriage without the wife having 
the same right cannot be recognized in Belgium. § 2. Such deed can however be 
recognized in Belgium after verifying whether the following cumulative conditions are 
satisfied: 1° the deed has been sanctioned by a judge in the State of origin, 2° neither of 
the spouses had at the time of the certification the nationality of a State of which the law 
does not know this manner of dissolution of the marriage; 3° neither of the spouses had 
at the time of the certification their habitual residence in a State of which the law does not 
know this manner of dissolution of the marriage; 4° the wife has accepted the dissolution 
in an unambiguous manner and without any coercion”. 
33 Within the Belgian case law see the leading cases: Cass., 18.6.2007; Cass. 3.12.2007, in 
J.Y CARLIER, Quand l’ordre public fait désordre. Pour une interprétation nuancée de l’ordre 
public de proximité en droit international privé. À propos de deux arrêts de cassation relatifs à la 
polygamie et à la répudiation, Revue générale de droit civil belge, 2008, p. 525. 
34 Among these, particularly relevant it is that concluded with the Kingdom of 
Morocco, Convention entre la République française et le Royaume du Maroc relative au statut 
des personnes et de la famille et à la coopération judiciaire, Décret n. 83-435 du 27 mai 1983, in 
J.O. 1er juin 1983, p. 1643 (art. 13).  
35 Cass. 17.2.2004, Revue critique de droit international privé, 2004, 423: «Mais attendu que 
l'arrêt retient que le jugement du Tribunal de Biskra avait été prononcé sur demande de M. X ... 
au motif que "la puissance maritale est entre les mains de l'époux selon la Charia et le Code" et 
que "le Tribunal ne peut qu'accéder à sa requête" ; qu'il en résulte que cette décision constatant 
une répudiation unilatérale du mari sans donner d'effet juridique à l'opposition éventuelle de la 
femme et en privant l'autorité compétente de tout pouvoir autre que celui d'aménager les 
conséquences financières de cette rupture du lien matrimonial, est contraire au principe d'égalité 
des époux lors de la dissolution du mariage, reconnu par l'article 5 du protocole du 22 novembre 
1984, n° 7, additionnel à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, que la France s'est 
engagée à garantir à toute personne relevant de sa juridiction, et à l'ordre public international 
réservé par l'article 1er d) de la Convention franco-algérienne du 27 août 1964, dès lors que, 
comme en l'espèce, la femme, sinon même les deux époux, étaient domiciliés sur le territoire 
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affirming that the provision of divorce-remedy available only to the 
husband-violates the principle of equality between spouses, as enshrined 
in art. 5 of Protocol 7 of the ECHR, and it is not allowed by the French 
public policy. In this case, we may find an abstract assessment concerning 
the repudiation, regardless of the woman's consent, supported by the 
reference to the equality between spouses as enshrined in international 
acts and more generally by the European public policy. Following this 
judgment, several times French judges refused to recognize the divorce 
requested by the wife36, according to Moroccan law37, the chicaq, in a case 
concerning couples resident in France for several years38.  
In the light of this case law, we can not be too optimistic about the 
possible outcomes of the provisions of the Council Regulation (EU) No 
1259/2010 of 20 December, implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation for the States 
participating (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Romania 
Slovenia)39. Article 10 targets on religious law, to solve the conflicts of 
laws that arise in case of repudiation. According to this provision, which is 
a special and additional kind of public policy provision, the law of the 
forum shall replace the applicable foreign law when that law “makes no 
provision for divorce or does not grant one of the spouses equal access to 
divorce or legal separation on grounds of their sex”. Laws not providing 
for divorce refer primarily to laws of a Canon law origin (until recently 
this applied to Malta in Europe), whereas laws discriminating on the basis 
of a spouse’s sex refer to, in particular, Islamic laws. As in the case of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
français; qu'ainsi, la cour d'appel a légalement justifié sa décision au regard des textes susvisés». 
On this case, see: H. FULCHIRON, “Ne répudiez point…” pour une interprétation raisonnée 
des arrêts du 17 février 2004, in Rev. int. droit. comp., 1, 2006, p. 7 ss.; M.L. NIBOYET, Regard 
français sur la reconnaissance en France des répudiations musulmanes, in Rev. int. droit comp., 
2006, 27, p. 32 ss.; M.C. NAJM, Le sort des répudiations musulmanes dans l’ordre juridique 
français. Droit et idéologie(s), in Droit et cultures, 2010, n. 59, p. 209. 
36 Cass., 3.1.2006, Revue critique droit internationale privé, 2006, p. 627; Cass. 4.11.2009, 
Dalloz, 2010, p. 543. 
37 Dahir n. 1.04.22, 3.2.2004, Bulletin Officiel du Royaume du Maroc, n. 5184, 5.2.2004, p. 
418. 
38 For some critical remarks to the French decisions, see: K. ZAHER, Plaidoyer pour la 
reconnaissance des divorces marocains, Revue critique, 2010, p. 313 e ss.; H. FULCHIRON, 
Droits fondamentaux et règles de droit international privé: conflits de droits, conflits de logiques? 
L’exemple de l’égalité des époux et responsabilité des époux au regard du mariage, durant le 
mariage, et lors de sa dissolution, in F. Sudre (ed.), Le droit au respect de la vie familiale au sens 
de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, 2002, p. 353 ss. 
39 O.J. 29.12.2010 L 343/14. 
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Belgian Code of private international law, it is not sure that judges will 
follow a strict interpretation of this regulation, whereas equal access to 
divorce is not granted on equal basis to spouses. 
The problems deriving from the application of nationality as 
connecting factor clearly show the difficult link to religious values. 
More recently the concept of habitual residence has been 
introduced, especially in EU private international law rules, as an 
alternative connecting factor to the principles of nationality and domicile. 
This concept is relatively new as a connecting factor in private 
international law; originally used in some bilateral conventions on 
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the notion of habitual residence is found in the Hague 
Convention of 1902 on Guardianship. After the Second World War, 
habitual residence has gained greater importance in the Hague 
Conventions as a connecting factor instead of citizenship. Habitual 
residence is meant to be different from domicile in that the element of 
intention is weaker. It is the regular physical presence in a country that 
constitutes the concept, thus making it easier to apply than the principle of 
domicile with its subjective element of intention. 
In contemporary private international law, there is a strong trend 
away from nationality principle and towards domicile or even more 
habitual residence as decisive for the choice of law in personal matters. 
The main argument for this shift seems to be that the principle of habitual 
residence is more suitable and adequate than the nationality for the 
authorities, since the nationality principle often points to foreign law as 
being applicable and to foreign institutions. However, Europeanization 
and Globalisation of sources of private international law does not preclude 
the chance that conflict of laws should also deal with individual identities. 
To the extent that the European systems have hitherto offered to the 
application of foreign laws, we find the problem of survival in Europe of 
an idea of the personality of laws. In fact it’s generally accepted that 
conflict of laws faces the individual identities of people involved in 
international relations. Cultural identity may be considered collective and 
individual at the same time, because each member of the group has an 
identity of its own. 
National law as a dimension of culture is part of a person’s identity. 
A person’s notion of law is part of the basis upon which expectations are 
built and choices made. Sometimes, in family matters legal regulations 
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express culture and religion40. This is the case even in secular societies 
because the roots of certain institutions like marriage are to be found in 
religion: seen from a Muslim point of view the Swedish religion-neutral 
family law legislation is the Swedish version of Christian marriage41. 
While nationality cannot be changed overnight, neither habitual residence 
nor domicile, used as connecting factors for choice of law, satisfy the 
requirements of a personal law, due to their instability and changeability. 
The law of nationality is the law of a person’s cultural origin. So, it’s clear 
that a person moving from one religious culture to another will find it 
strange and unacceptable to be subjected to the family laws of the new 
country of domicile or habitual residence upon arrival or shortly after.  
 
 
3 - Electio iuris and religious values 
 
Among the shortcuts available to “personalize” the conflict of laws rules, 
respecting religious values, the first one is given by the well–known 
connecting factor of the electio iuris.  
In fact the electio iuris is a connecting factor generally used in the 
field of contracts. The parties of a contract usually do a selection as to the 
applicable law that can be explicit, implied but unambiguous (i.e. in case 
of the choice of forum), and not opposed to public policy. Such is the case 
even if the selected legal system has no real connection with the contract. 
To give effect to religious values within the field of conflict of laws, 
someone suggests to adapt the selection available to individuals42.  
National judges are usually not in favour of this solution, for 
instance in the case of the spouses who get divorced by mutual consent 
according to the Thai law and registered the divorce at the Thai embassy 
in Bonn. The BGH applied the German law as lex fori, instead of the Thai 
law and declared null and void the divorce43. Subsequently the solution of 
the BGH became the codified rule of art. 17 EGBGB44. If the choice of law 
could have worked in the case, the solution would have been different, as 
                                                          
40 H. THUE, Connecting Factors, cit., p. 59. 
41 H. THUE, Connecting Factors, cit., p. 59. 
42 L. GANNAGÉ, La pénétration de l’autonomie de la volonté dans le droit international 
privé de la famille, Revue critique dr. int. privé, 1992, p. 425; J.Y. CARLIER, Autonomie de la 
volontè et statut personnel, Bruylant, Bruzelles, 1992. 
43 BGH, 14.10.1981, BGHZ 82, p. 34, IPRax, 1983, p. 37. 
44 G. KEGEL, Scheidung von Ausländern im Inland durch Rechtsheschäft, IPRax, 1982, p. 
22. 
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in the case of the Rome III regulation. The non-application of the Thai law 
of the couple -thus forcing them to obtain a judicial decision to get 
divorced - is against the protection of the cultural identity of the person45. 
Another paradigmatic illustration of the courts’ reluctance to enter 
into the religious sphere is the case concerned a bank loan dispute decided 
by the English Court of Appeal. In the case, Shamil Bank, the choice of 
court in the loan contract was in favour of an English Court, but the clause 
stipulating the law to govern the contract referred to Shari’a. The Court of 
Appeal decided the dispute only on the basis of the English Law, 
affirming, among other dicta, that Islamic rules were really only religious 
principles and far too imprecise to be applied, while the international rules 
applicable to contracts envisaged only the law of a particular state legal 
system46. 
Likewise, against the application of Islamic Law there is the 
consistent American case law concerning mahr47, the compulsory gift from 
husband to wife, the amount of which is normally agreed upon in relation 
to the marriage contract, paid either at the time of marriage, on demand, 
or at the dissolution of marriage by divorce or death. For example in 2001, 
the California Court of Appeal refused to apply the Islamic law in the case 
concerning an Egyptian couple married in Egypt, according to a pre–
nuptial agreement, because of the difficult of regulating the mahr, as “the 
legal system in various Islamic countries will often be influenced by one 
school or the other”48. In 2007, the Washington Court of Appeals applied 
the Washington Law, in a case concerning Jordanian citizens, resident in 
US, because there is no “written separation contract or prenuptial 
agreement” and “if the marriage certificate is a prenuptial agreement, it is 
invalid because it was economically unfair on its face” (the exchange of 19 
pieces of gold for equitable property rights is unfair under the Wash. Rev. 
Code § 26.09.080)49. 
                                                          
45 E. JAYME, Menschenrechte und Theorie des Internationalen Privatrecht, Jahresheft der 
Internationalen Juristenvereinigung, Osnabrück 1991/1992, 2, p. 8. 
46 Beximco Pharmaceuticals v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC [2004] Part 12, Case 9 [CAEW], 
available at www.ipsofactoJ.com/international/index.htm. 
47 Several words are used as synonymous: sadaq, which means friendship, present, gift 
(Qu’ran verse 4:4); farida, which means “a gift or disposition instituted by God” (Qu’ran 
verses 2:236; 2: 237; 4:24); sometimes the mahr has a religious object: the gift of Koran, the 
gift of some lessons on Koran. See the Encyclopedia of Islam online. 
48 In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Reptr. 2d 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), Lexis Nexis 
Academic, n. 349. 
49 In re Marriage of Souhail Altayar and Sarah Assawad Muhyaddin, n. 57475-2-I (Wash. Ct. 
App., July 23,2007), Lexis Nexis Academic, n. 2102. 
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In the opposite direction we may find only the French 
jurisprudence about cases concerning mahr50. In 1995, the Cour d’Appel de 
Paris classifies mahr as an indicator of the choice of property regime, in a 
case concerning a Lebanese citizen of the Greek Catholic confession, 
already married according to the Lebanese law, and subsequently married 
with a Polish citizen in Lebanon according to the Muslim rites - the only 
way to marry the new girlfriend as he could not get the divorce according 
to the Lebanese law. At the moment of the divorce from the second wife, 
he had to pay his wife 3,000 Lebanese pounds. The Court of Appeal of 
Paris’ judgment considers mahr as an indicator of the choice of property 
regime:  
 
“the existence of a dower excludes the choice of a regime of 
community of property, and (…) in signing this marriage contract 
Mr. T and Mrs. K. have expressed their wish to place themselves 
under the regime of separate estates, which is the only regime 
recognised by Muslim law, with a clause concerning dower, and also 
in accordance with the laws of Lebanon according to which the 
matrimonial regime is that of separate estates, as well as the custom 
certificate presented”51.  
 
Likewise, in the case of a Muslim couple of Indian origin, married in India 
in 1969 and resident in France where they divorced in 1990, claiming, on 
the one hand the division of property, following the French régime legal 
(the wife), and on the other hand, the agreement on the adoption of 
separate estates (the husband), the Cour de Cassation, overruling the 
judgment of the Cour d’Appel de Lyon, stated that the “act called mahr is 
a convention establishing the spouses’ consent to marry to which the 
payment of dower is added and which is not against the French ordre 
public”52.  
Nowadays, following the well-known process of Europeanization 
of private international law, some tentative indications of a change 
towards the consideration of cultural identity in conflict of laws through 
the choice of law may be found, in family matters, in the so called Rome III 
regulation. To solve many problems in terms of legal certainty and 
predictability for the parties, the regulation offers to the States 
                                                          
50 Several words are used as synonymous: sadaq, which means friendship, present, gift 
(Qu’ran verse 4:4); farida, which means “a gift or disposition instituted by God” (Qu’ran 
verses 2:236; 2: 237; 4:24); sometimes the mahr has a religious object: the gift of Koran, the 
gift of some lessons on Koran. See the Encyclopedia of Islam online. 
51 App. Paris, 14.6.1995, Revue critique de droit international privé, 1997, p. 41. 
52 Cass. 22.11.2005, Journal du droit international, 2006, pp. 1365-1377. 
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participating in the enhanced cooperation (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, 
Austria, Portugal, Romania Slovenia) a set of uniform conflict of laws 
rules, among which the choice of the law applicable to divorce or 
separation is a very important one. In fact the regulation No 1259/2010 
enables the spouses to designate the law of the country of which one of 
them is a national [Article 5(1)(c)], and provides for the residual 
application of the law of the spouses’ common nationality when they have 
not chosen the applicable law [Article 8(c)]. So within the countries 
participating to the Rome III regulation, couples, asking for divorce or 
separation, may choose the applicable law to these proceedings, avoiding 
the conflict of cultures determined by the lex fori application. 
Moreover, regarding the conditions of the choice of law clause, 
article 6 par. 2 of the Rome III regulation states that “Nevertheless, a 
spouse in order to establish that he did not consent, may rely upon the law 
of the country in which he has his habitual residence at the time the court 
is seized if it appears from the circumstances that it would not be 
reasonable to determine the effect of his conduct in accordance with the 
law specified in paragraph 1”. This rule seems specially conceived for the 
case of a choice of law agreement, between Muslim spouses, for the 
application of the law of a Muslim country. Through par. 2 of Article 6 of 
the Rome III Regulation, Muslim women may avoid the effects of an 
agreement, which they were once forced to sign, claiming the application 
of the law of the country where they are domiciled at the time the 
procedure for divorce begins53. 
 
 
4 - Public policy and religious values 
 
Another shortcut on the path towards legal pluralism and consideration of 
religious values within conflict of law rules, is the approach affirming the 
necessary recognition of factual situations, a social need for continuity and 
stability54. 
                                                          
53 R. ESPINOSA CALABUIG, Elección de una ley por las partes al divorcio y a la 
separación judici, al: la solución “limitada” del Reglamento Roma III, in I. QUEIROLO, A.M. 
BENEDETTI, L. CARPANETO, Le nuove famiglie tra globalizzazione e identità statuali, 
Aracne, Roma, 2014, p. 235. 
54 R. BARATTA, La reconnaissance des situations en droit international privé, Recueil des 
Cours, 2010 (348), pp. 253-499. 
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What is actually at stake is if the court’s obligation to apply the 
foreign law according to the principle iura novit curia - which in the 
continental system is frequently extended to cover also applicable foreign 
law - can include foreign religious law. If the parties are not able to 
provide the court with reliable information on the content of religious 
laws as approved by state law, how should the court proceed? According 
to settled European case law, in situations of failure to sufficiently prove 
the content of the applicable foreign law, the claim is, normally, either 
dismissed or rejected. Alternatively, it is decided in accordance with the 
substantive law of the forum state. A third model is the application of a 
“closely related law”, either that of a very similar legal system within the 
same legal family or a presumably similar regulation of another state. 
When a religious law is at stake, it is not evident that any of these 
solutions is truly suitable.  
Another problem concerns the loyal application of foreign law. As 
pointed out by Michael Bogdan, «a court applying foreign law should be 
cautiously conservative and it must resist the temptation to “improve” the 
foreign rules by interpreting them according to its own preferences»55. But 
as the selected case law shows, national courts tend to interpret the foreign 
rules in line with forum law or to adjust them to fit the values underlying 
their own legal system. An additional challenge posed by religious law is 
that its traditional interpretation, according to the sacred sources, is 
increasingly questioned.  
In this context we may find the German case law concerning the 
mahr. 
In 1987 the BGH dealt with the problem of the legal validity of an 
arrangement between an Arab woman, Israeli citizen, and her German 
husband, converted to Islam. At the moment of the divorce, the woman 
asks for the mahr (100000 DM), but the husband claims for the invalidity of 
the arrangement according to the German law. The BGH at first solves the 
conflict of laws applying the German law, as the law where the couple has 
the residence, but qualifies the mahr as a maintenance agreement valid 
according under the Islamic law applicable to the marriage, considering 
the marriage as a condition of the agreement56. 
                                                          
55 M. BOGDAN, Private International Law as Component of the Law of the Forum, 348 
Recueil des Cours, 2010, p. 113. 
56 BGH, 28.1.1987, IPRax 1988, 109; H.J. HESSLER, Islamisch-rechtliche Morgengabe: 
vereinbarter Vermögensausgleich im deutschen Scheidungsfolgenrecht, IPRax, 1988, p. 95. 
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Likewise it is well known the consideration of the mahr in the case 
law of the High Court of England in the case Qureshi v. Qureshi57, 
concerning a Pakistani citizen and his Indian wife, who had got married in 
Britain and divorced through a Talaq procedure, pronounced here. In the 
case, the conflict of laws problems is solved applying the English law, but 
the Court states that  
 
“it is only if the marriage is recognised and dissolved that the wife is 
entitled to dower. Whatever the judgment of this court, the husband 
will not return to the wife. I trust that it will not be thought cynical if 
I feel that she is really better off with a judgment for a considerable 
sum of money, which is likely to be more easily enforceable while the 
husband is in this country, than with a largely meaningless right to be 
recognised locally as his wife” 58.  
 
In the case it is relevant the decision to apply Pakistani law on a talaq 
pronounced in England as a condition to enforce the wife’s claim for mahr. 
Within this approach a different interpretation of public policy is 
possible59. 
Under the influence of human rights, the new notion of public 
policy exception, not only and not necessarily national, sometimes leads to 
refuse recognition of foreign decisions sometimes to impose it, on 
procedural grounds related to the right to a fair trial. The public policy 
exception may be applied as an instrument of integration of the diversities 
within a common concept of justice. 
A very significant application of this approach seems recently 
suggested also by the ECtHR with regard to another highly problematic 
institution set up on religious rules whose recognition is very difficult in 
Western countries: the kafala, a measure of child protection that neither 
terminates the pre–existing relationship between the child and the parents, 
nor establishes a legal parent-child relationship with the new parents, as 
adoption is not legally possible, according to a generally accepted 
interpretation of the Koran60. In Harroudj, the ECtHR states that a violation 
                                                          
57 Qureshi v. Qurehsi (1972), Probate Division, Weekly Law Reports, 173. 
58 Qureshi v. Qurehsi (1972), Probate Division, Weekly Law Reports, 201. 
59 J.Y. CARLIER, Diversité culturelle et droit international privé. De l’ordre public aux 
accomodements reciproques?, in Diritto internazionale e pluralità delle culture, SIDI, 2014, 125 
ss. 
60 Koran, Sura XXXIII, Al-Ahzab, 4-5. In many countries adoption is forbidden with the 
exception of Tunisia where the adoption is provided by the Act n. 58-27, 4.3.1958: see the 
Algerian Code de la famille, law n. 84 -11, 9.6.1984, regulating Kafala in the Chapter VII, 
while adoption is forbidden by Article 46 (“L’adoption (tabannì) est interdite par la chari’a et 
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of Article 8 of the European Convention may be ascertained when 
personal status legally and stably constituted abroad are denied 
transnational continuity61. Even if in the case, the kafala Algerian order 
might not have been converted into adoption, as asked by a French couple 
- due to a French law provision - the Court states the need to recognize the 
factual situation, accommodating the law of the country of origin with the 
nationality law:  
 
“Furthermore, the Court notes that the judicial grant of kafala is fully 
recognised by the respondent State and that it produces effects in that 
country that are comparable in the present case to those of 
guardianship, since the child, Hind, had no known parentage when 
she was placed in care. In that connection, the domestic courts 
emphasised the fact that the applicant and the child had the same 
surname, as a result of the relevant legal procedure, and that the 
applicant exercised parental authority, entitling her to take any 
decision in the child’s interest. Admittedly, as kafala does not create 
any legal parent-child relationship, it has no effects for inheritance 
and does not suffice to enable the child to acquire the foster parent’s 
nationality. That being said, there are means of circumventing the 
restrictions that stem from the inability to adopt a child. In addition 
to the name-change procedure, to which the child was entitled in the 
present case on account of her unknown parentage in Algeria, it is 
also possible to draw up a will with the effect of allowing the child to 
inherit from the applicant and to appoint a legal guardian in the 
event of the foster parent’s death” 62. 
 
The various points examined above show that the respondent State, 
applying the international conventions that govern such matters, has put 
in place a flexible arrangement to accommodate the law of the child’s State 
of origin and the national law. The Court notes that the prohibition of 
adoption stems from the choice-of-law rule in Article 370-3 of the Civil 
Code but that French law provides the means to alleviate the effects of that 
prohibition, based on the objective signs of a child’s integration into 
French society. Firstly, the choice-of-law rule is expressly set aside by the 
same Article 370-3 in cases where “the minor was born and habitually 
resides in France”. 
                                                                                                                                                               
la loi”); in the Moroccan Moudawana (Code du statut personnel et successoral) reformed 
on 3.2.2004, adoption is forbidden by Article 83.3; kafala is ruled by the Dahir portant loi 
n. 1-02-172, 13.6.2002. 
61 Harroudj v. France [2012], Eur. Cour. N. 43631/09, § 51. 
62 Harroudj v. France [2012], Eur. Cour. N. 43631/09, § 51. 
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Likewise, the so called accommodation approach has gradually 
taken place with regard to recognition of polygamous marriages, given 
that many countries have passed from denying any effect at all of such 
acts – as in contrast with public policy – to a partial recognition. 
Problems arise in the European countries as the general rule is that 
marriages celebrated here cannot be other than monogamous. In fact 
within the Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the 
right to family reunification (O.J. L 251/12, 3.10.2003) we can read:  
 
“(11) The right to family reunification should be exercised in proper 
compliance with the values and principles recognised by the Member 
States, in particular with respect to the rights of women and of 
children; such compliance justifies the possible taking of restrictive 
measures against applications for family reunification of polygamous 
households”.  
 
Art. 4 states that the family reunification cannot be allowed to a second 
spouse when the first spouse is already resident in a member State. 
Moreover, in Italy Art. 18 of the Regulation of the Civil Status 
forbids the registrations of foreign acts contrary to public policy. While 
polygamous marriages are not recognized for public policy reasons63, but 
only when they are effectively polygamous, not if they are monogamous 
but celebrated according to a law allowing polygamy64, the acts of birth of 
kids born within these marriages must be recognized because in this case 
the best interests of the child prevail, even if it is debatable if this 
fundamental principle may be read as an exception to the public policy 
clause or as a basic value of this. On this concern, it’s necessary to point 
out that this solution may be attained also through the consideration of the 
attenuated effect of the public policy exception, according to which it is 
possible to recognize situations constituted abroad: since the polygamous 
marriage has been celebrated abroad, the public policy exception can be 
applied less rigorously in the Italian system, and therefore it can not be 
used to avoid the recognition of the effects of this institution. In particular, 
it has been recognized to the second wife and children of the same (to be 
                                                          
63 See T.A.R. Emilia Romagna, n. 926/94, Gli Stranieri, 1995, II, p. 613: in this case the 
status of wife has not been allowed to the second wife of a foreign citizen for public policy 
reasons against the recognition of the polygamous marriage for purposes of family 
reunification. 
64 Cass., 2.3.1999, n. 1739, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1999, 613; for a similar case decided in 
UK see Hussain v. Hussain (1982), 1 All ER 369 (1983) 4 FLR 339. 
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recognized as legitimate however) succession and maintenance rights, 
social security65, residence rights66.  
The reason of these solutions is clear: to protect second or further 
wives, to protect children, according to the principle of the best interest of 
the child67, affirmed by Art. 3 of the UN 1989 Convention, and by Art. 24 
of the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, and strongly applied by 
the ECtHR in several cases68, and to grant them the rights deriving from 
marital status. In Italy the leading case has been decided by the Supreme 
Court in 199969; anyway it must be pointed out that is a specific one, 
concerning the succession of an Italian citizen, a widower, married in 
Somalia with a Somali woman who claims her successorial rights in 
contrast with those of the daughters born from the first marriage of the 
deceased. The judgment confirms the validity of the marriage in 
accordance with what has already been stated by the Tribunal of Lodi and 
by the Court of Appeal of Milan. The judgment is also interesting because 
it seems to generalize the validity of the marriage celebrated according to 
Islamic law, when it is object of a preliminary question of the hereditary 
devolution. In this case the validity of the marriage does not involve 
insertion of foreign provisions in the rules of the law of the forum, and so 
it doesn’t affect the Italian public policy. 
The suggested approach is undoubtedly interesting as an inclusive 
tool of religious values. Moreover it seeks to attain the most equitable 
result, using the comparative legal method, aiming at respecting cultural 
identity and legal pluralism. The main problem of this approach is 
however the unpredictability of the solutions, depending at first on the 
choice of law solution and in a subsidiary way on the law regarded as a 
fact. Anyway, according to many systems a marriage celebrated abroad is 
not void on the grounds that it is entered into under a law which permits 
                                                          
65 In Italy see: Cass., 2.3.1999, n. 1739, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1999, p. 613. 
66 App. Torino, 18.4.2001, in Dir. fam pers., 2001, p. 1492; contra see Cass. 28.2.2013, n. 
4984: in this case the claim to the family reunification of the second wife has been 
dismissed, even if supported by the presence of the son of the woman, for the presence of 
the first wife of the father of the son in Italy.  
67 C. FOCARELLI, La convenzione di New York e il concetto di best interests of the child, 
Riv. dir. int., 2010, p. 981 ss.; P. ALSTON, The best interest of a child: reconciling culture and 
human rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994. 
68 18.4.2006, Dickson v. United Kingdom, n. 44362/04; concurring opinion Bonello, par. 15: 
“The particular circumstances of this case lead me to believe that permitting offspring to be born to 
the applicants would not be fostering the best interests of the desired child. It would, on the 
contrary, be injurious to the ‘rights of others’.  
69 In Italy see: Cass., 2.3.1999, n. 1739, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1999, p. 613. 
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polygamy; article 45 of the 1987 Swiss Statute on private international law 
expressly states that a marriage validly celebrated abroad is recognised in 
Switzerland70.  
Moreover, we may find judgments of other countries that open new 
chances of recognition, considering the personal laws of the spouses not 
banning this kind of marriage71. The reason is clear: to protect second or 
further wives and to grant them the rights deriving from marital status. 
The real problem is that the first wife is strongly prejudiced when she is 
required to share her succession’s portion of the deceased husband. The 
approach aiming at considering the factual situation leads in these cases to 
the accommodation of religious values, recognizing the effects of 
polygamous marriages, and suggesting the division of estates or of the 
survivor’s pension among the wives of the deceased husband72. 
The suggested approach is undoubtedly interesting as an inclusive 
tool of religious values. Moreover it seeks to attain the most equitable 
result, using the comparative legal method, aiming at respecting cultural 
identity and religious values. The main problem of this approach is 
however the unpredictability of the solutions, depending at first on the 
choice of law solution and in a subsidiary way on the law regarded as a 
fact. 
 
 
5 - The Conventional approach 
 
Religious values in cross-border cases are inevitably connected with 
application of foreign law. There exists a considerable uncertainty 
regarding the conditions for the application of religious law, for example, 
whether such law is to be applied ex officio, whether the court or the 
parties are to establish the foreign law, and what solution is to be chosen 
when its content is not proved. 
An additional problem is adjusting the applicable foreign law to the 
rules of the forum on procedure. The links between the foreign law and a 
certain religion can increase the problems facing the court.  
At present, very different approaches are being followed by 
European courts in all these respects. However, having foreign law 
applied to the case generally largely depends on the parties’ activities and 
the efforts they are prepared to make. This state of affairs has not 
                                                          
70 In Italy see: Cass., 2.3.1999, n. 1739, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1999, p. 613. 
71 In Belgium: Cour Const., 4.6.2009, n. 96/2009, El Haddouchi. 
72 In Belgium: Cass. 18.3.2013, in Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2013, p. 861. 
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contributed to any “unity of result”, which common rules on choice of law 
(where such exist) could otherwise achieve73.  
Common rules on choice of law may become a way to take into 
account religious values. Multilateral treaties, as those developed by the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, since its inception in 
1893, allow to reach a high degree of legal certainty. When countries with 
complex legal systems joined the Conference, like Egypt in 1961, Israel in 
1964, Morocco in 1993, Jordan in 2001, Malaysia in 2002, India in 2008, 
Singapore in 2014, the need to develop rules considering the personal 
systems became relevant. 
Three problematic issues strongly affected by religious values may 
be solved under the rules developed by the Hague Conventions. 
First of all it is considered the case of unilateral divorces regarding 
whose the Hague Convention of 1 June 1970 on the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separations (in force for Albania, Australia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom) sets up the conditions under which foreign divorces will 
have effect in each State party. The Convention provides an effective 
strategy to give effect to divorces and legal separations, including 
religious unilateral divorces, avoiding the problems deriving from limping 
divorces, the ones valid in one country but not in another. So, to make 
repudiations recognizable abroad, the Convention states that they must 
“follow judicial or other proceedings officially recognised” in the State 
where they take place. To answer to a question posed in § 1, it is not 
enough that the Muslim husband pronounces TALAQ three times in India 
to get validly divorced. Even if the Hague Convention 1970 has not 
reached many ratifications, we may see its influence over some national 
systems, i.e. the Moroccan one as the New Moroccan Civil Code adopted 
in 2004 has placed divorce under strict judicial control74. Regarding the 
second condition, it is necessary to consider that the State where 
proceedings take place must officially recognise such proceedings: so 
repudiation pronounced by a husband at his consulate in a Western 
country or before a religious authority here would not be considered to 
comply with the Hague Convention. Finally, to recognise repudiation 
                                                          
73 M. JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG, Cross-border family cases and Religious Diversity: What can 
Judges do? WP 2013, Uppsala faculty of Law, http://www.jur.uu.se. 
74 H. van LOON, The accomodation of religious laws in cross-border situations: the 
contribution of the Hague Conference on private international law, Cuadernos der. trans., 2010, 
p. 263. 
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according to the Hague Convention rules, it is necessary a genuine link 
between the State where the divorce was obtained and the divorced 
spouses, and that both spouses have had the opportunity to present their 
case. 
Other problems are posed by the kafala, the well-known institution 
in Muslim countries to protect children without a family. As already 
pointed out75, the recognition of it is problematic in Western countries and 
in order to solve the problem and the possible contrast with public policy, 
the Hague Conference drew up the Convention of 19 October 1996 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation 
in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of 
Children. This Convention states that the recognition of kafala or an 
analogous institution requires the cooperation of the Central Authority of 
both the State of origin and the receiving State. Italy finally joined this 
Convention, here in force since 1.1.201676. 
In Italy sometimes kafala has been recognized as a condition for the 
decree of adoption in special cases (art. 44, lett. d, law 4.5.1983, n. 184)77. 
Following the general acceptance of kafala, Italian Judges have pronounced 
the adoption of children entrusted to intended parents through kafala78, 
recalling art. 44 of the l. 1983/184. More often, kafala is recognized within 
the family reunification context, through the case law aimed at broadening 
the scope of Article. 29 § two of T.U. on immigration, putting on the same 
foot for the purposes of family reunification, adopted children, children 
subject to custody or to kafala79. However, the kafala has been recognized 
in Italy very slowly for purposes of family reunification, “as suitable for 
abandoned children without creating parent–child ties”80, even because a 
ruling which excludes kafala as a protocol for reuniting families would 
                                                          
75 See § 4. 
76 Council Decision 2008/431/EC of 5.6.2008 authorising certain member States to 
ratify or accede to, in the interest of the European Community, the 1996 Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation 
in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, L 151, 
11.6.2008. On 30 September 2015, Italy deposited its instrument of ratification of the 
Hague Convention. So, the 1996 Hague Convention is finally in force in all Member States 
of the European Union, since 1st January 2016 (l. 18.6.2015, n. 101).  
77 Trib. Min. Trento, d. 5.3.2002, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2002, 1056; Trib. Min Trento, 
in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2003, I, p. 149; Cass., 4.11.2005 n. 21395, Giur. it., 2007, 611. 
78 Trib. Min. Trento, d. 5.3.2002, in Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2002, p. 1056; Trib. Min. 
Trento, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2003, I, p. 149. 
79 Cass., 20.3.2008, n. 7472, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 2008, p. 809; Cass., 2.7. 2008 n. 18174, 
17.7. 2008, n. 19734; Cass. 2.2.2015, n. 1843. 
80 Trib. Biella, 26.4.2007, Dir. fam pers., 2007, IV, p. 1824. 
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“penalise (…) all children from Arab countries, illegitimate, orphaned or 
otherwise in a state of neglection, it represents the only institutionalised 
form of protection provided by Islamic law”81. Sometimes kafala has been 
recognized through judicial recognition82, sometimes it has been 
automatically recognized through administrative procedures (within the 
claim for family reunification)83. On this concern, the Italian judges 
pointed out very clearly the compatibility of kafala with the public policy, 
above all in view of the aforementioned provision of the UN Convention84. 
Differently from what happens in other countries where kafala sometimes 
is considered contrary to public policy (as in Switzerland and in 
Luxembourg), in Italy we may find only one recent case in which kafala 
has been deemed in contrast with public policy, notwithstanding the 
consideration for the best interests of the child involved in the case85. The 
only unsolved problem concerned the kafala in cases of family 
reunification with an Italian citizen: in these cases the reunification to an 
Italian Kafil could not be pronounced because of the mandatory rules 
provided by the Law n. 184/1983. The family reunification of a foreign 
minor entrusted to an Italian citizen was deemed as possible only through 
adoption procedures in many cases86. Recently, the Italian Supreme Court 
solved this problem with a very important statement in the judgment 
                                                          
81 Cass., 17.7.2008, n. 19734, Dir. imm., citt., 2009, 2, p. 198 
82 See Trib. Biella, 7.3.2000, Dir. imm., citt., 2000, 1, p. 121; Trib. Milano, 12.3.2000, in 
Dir. imm., citt., 2000, 2, p. 127; Trib. Firenze, 9.11.2006, Dir. imm., citt., 2007, 1, p. 169; Trib. 
Torino, 26.2.2009, Dir. imm., citt., 2009, 2, p. 216; Trib. Rovereto, 21.5.2009, www.asgi.it; 
Trib. Brescia, 3.8.2009; App. Firenze, 2.2.2007, Dir. imm., citt., 2007, 4, p. 139; App. Torino, 
30.5.2007, Dir. imm., citt., 2008, 1, p. 191; App. Torino, 28.6.2007, Dir. imm., citt., 2007, pp. 3 
142; App. Torino, 18.7.2007, Dir. fam. 2008, 1, p. 143; App. Trento, 1.10.2009, www.asgi.it; 
Cass. 3.3.2008, n. 7472, Fam. dir., 2008, p. 675; 
83 App. Bari, 16.4.2004, Fam. dir., 2005, p. 62; Trib. Min. Reggio Calabria, 10.10.2006, 
Fam. min., 2006, 2, p. 86. 
84 App. Firenze, d., 2.2.2007, Dir. imm., citt., 2007, 4, p. 139, App. Torino, 30.5.2007, Dir. 
imm., citt., 2008, 1, p. 191; Cass., 16.9.2013, n. 21108, Fam. Dir., 2014, 2, p. 122:” Non può 
essere rifiutato il nulla osta all’ingresso nel territorio nazionale per ricongiungimento 
familiare richiesto nell’interesse di minore cittadino extracomunitario affidato a cittadino 
italiano residente in Italia con provvedimento di kafalah pronunciato dal giudice 
straniero nel caso in cui il minore stesso sia a carico o conviva nel paese di provenienza 
con il cittadino italiano ovvero gravi motivi di salute impongano che debba essere da 
questi personalmente assistito”. 
85 Trib. Reggio Emilia, ord. 9.2. 2005, Dir. Imm., citt., 2005, 2, p. 183: in this case the 
claim for family reunification is founded on a kafala concerning a girl living in Morocco 
with her own parents and entrusted to an uncle domiciled in Italy. 
86 Trib. Torino, 11.7.2008, Dir. imm., citt., 2009, 2, p. 209; App. Torino, 19.11.2009, Fam. 
Dir., 2010, p. 787; Cass., 1.3.2010, 4868, Dir. fam., 2010, p. 1629; Cass., 7.10.2011, n. 20722. 
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adopted on 16.9.2013, n. 2110887: the right to family reunification is 
allowed to the minor entrusted in kafala to the Italian citizen when the 
minor is living or dependent on the Italian citizen, or when the minor 
needs special assistance. 
The Italian Supreme Court states this solution applying the d. lgs. 
6.2.2007 n. 30 (implementing the EU Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 
2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC - O. J. L 158/77, 
30.4.2004), through a broaden interpretation of the notion ruled in Article 
2 lett. B n. 3: the minor dependent on the Italian citizen is not only a 
descendent but also the minor entrusted through a foreign judicial act of 
kafala (not through a contractual act). It’s clear that the Italian Supreme 
Court is affirming the relevance of kafala to the recognition of the 
fundamental rights of children only when the Italian public policy is not a 
fence against this recognition; otherwise - as in case of kafala contractually 
stated - the solution might be different. 
The problematic case law about kafala highlights the relevant role of 
the conventional approach in considering religious values in conflict of 
laws. Notwithstanding the fact that the Conference continues to promote 
wide ratification of its principal acts, very few Islamic countries have 
already joined them. Religious values may be considered, in this case, as 
an obstacle to the development of Conventional rules. In fact, several 
problems are posed about the 1970 Hague Convention by the rule of 
Article 6, par. 2, which reads “The recognition of a divorce or legal 
separation shall not be refused because a law was applied other than that 
applicable under the rules of private international law of that state”. In 
India, for example, this rule is against the general solution stated by the 
Supreme Court, according to which “the jurisdiction assumed by the 
foreign court as well as the grounds on which the relief is granted must be 
in accordance with the matrimonial law (namely Hindu law) under which 
the parties are married”88. 
Much more work needs to be done thus - probably through the 
other aforementioned approaches. 
 
                                                          
87 Cass., 16.9.2013, s.u., n. 21108, Fam. Dir., 2014, 2, p. 110. 
88 Y. Narashima Rao v. Y. Venkatalakshmi, AIR 1991 SC 821. 
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6 - Conclusive Remarks 
 
The wide evolution of private international law is currently recalling 
attention to the consideration of religious values within the general 
aspects of the discipline. 
Europeanization and globalisation of sources of private 
international law does not preclude the chance that conflict of laws should 
also deal with individual identities. To the extent that the European 
systems have hitherto offered to the application of foreign laws, we are 
faced with the problem of survival in Europe of an idea of the personality 
of laws. In fact it’s generally accepted that conflict of laws faces the 
individual identities of people involved in international relations. Cultural 
identity may be considered collective and individual at the same time, 
because each member of the group has an identity of its own. 
Religious values contribute to defining the cultural identity of 
individuals: be it in Europe or other countries, cultures, values, 
civilization, religion, are never absent from the solutions of personal 
status. The personality of the law, the assertion of a link between law and 
morals, and religion, resulting in Europe from the ideas of Pasquale 
Stanislao Mancini can be found in Islam too. In fact, although these theses 
now seem out-dated, as they were supported in the nineteenth century, 
there is a clear convergence with the Islamic concept of personal status. 
However, coordination of legal systems under different individual 
identities is complex, in terms of European systems as well as of the 
Muslims systems. As for European systems, the possible reception of 
certain institutions of Islamic law (polygamy, repudiation, kafala) may 
develop solutions in contrast with the fundamental right enshrined in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In systems of Muslim tradition, 
the recognition of foreign decisions involving nationals of the forum State 
may not comply with mandatory and religious requirements of family 
law. 
The Treaty law does not seem able to provide effective remedies to 
these problems, above all to problems concerning complex systems, 
because Islamic states traditionally do not join the Hague Conventions 
(with the exception of Morocco, which has ratified the 1996 Convention on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, recognition, enforcement and Cooperation in 
respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the protection of 
Children, and of India which ratified the 1993 Convention on the 
Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry 
Adoption). Religious values may be rightly considered the main reason 
why Muslim countries do not accept the conventional approach. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 7/2016 
22 febbraio 2016                                                                                                    ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
28 
 
It is therefore necessary to consider different methods in order to 
overcome cultural differences, because the challenges posed by Islamic 
institutions confirm the relevant role of conflict of laws, offering 
appropriate treatments of cultural differences. 
Likewise, a new interpretation of the public policy exception seems 
going to be gradually developed as an inclusive tool of religious values 
and as a way to achieve legal pluralism. At a first glance, legal pluralism 
and public policy seem to be antithetical principles. The application of the 
public policy exception points out, on the contrary, a possible different 
interpretation of the exception, aimed at considering religious values and 
the principles of the forum in view of the protection of fundamental rights 
of individuals, as in the case of the recognition of some effects deriving 
from the polygamous marriage i.e. the division of estates of the survivor’s 
pension among the wives of the deceased husband89, or the inheritance 
rights of the relatives90. 
The suggested interpretation is interesting as an inclusive tool of 
religious values, and as a way to achieve legal pluralism. Moreover it 
seeks to attain the most equitable result, using the comparative legal 
method, aiming at respecting cultural identity and religious values. The 
main problem of this approach is however the definition of the borders of 
the public policy exception, in view of the unpredictability of the 
solutions, depending at first on the choice of law solution and in a 
subsidiary way on the law regarded as a fact. Moreover the problem of 
limping situations produced by Italian judges applying the public policy 
exception cannot be underestimated91: for example many doubts may arise 
in order to the recognition of marriages of Muslim women with Italian 
citizens in their national country, even if authorized by the Italian judges 
for public policy reasons. 
                                                          
89 In Belgium: Cass. 18.3.2013, Rev. trim. dr. fam., 2013, p. 861. 
90 In Italy see: Cass., 2.3.1999, n. 1739, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1999, p. 613, concerning 
the case of the succession of an Italian citizen, a widower, married in Somalia with a 
Somali woman who claims her successoral rights in contrast with those of the daughters 
born of the first marriage of the deceased. 
91 About the proceeding, available against the decision of the civil registrar not to 
proceed with the publication, (art. 98 of the Civil Status Regulation), to get the 
authorization to publications, see Trib. Verona, d 6.3.1987, Stato civile it., 1987, II, p. 201; 
Trib. Torino, d. 24 febbraio 1992, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1992, p. 985; Trib. Torino, d. 
24.6.1993, Dir. fam., 1993, p. 1181; Trib. Napoli, d. 29.4.1996, Fam. Dir., 1996, p. 454; Trib. 
Treviso, 15.4.1997, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc., 1997, P. 744 e ss.; Trib. Treviso, d. 24.9.2008, 
www.asgi.it. 
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In the light of these considerations, we may ask if within the notion 
of public policy considered by the ECtHR a “charte blanche justificant toute 
mesure”92, we may include fundamental values, like religious values, 
personal rights and status rights. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92 ECtHR, 27.1.2015, Paradiso e Campanelli v. Italy, ric. n. 25358/12: «l’ordre public ne 
saurait toutefois passer pour une charte blanche justificant toute mesure, car l’obligation de 
prendre en compte l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant incombe à l’État indépendamment de la nature 
du lien parental, génétique ou autre» (Paradiso e Campanelli v. Italie, cit., par. 80). 
